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AN ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE WAR AGAINST TERROR
The Australian Government's response to international terrorism since September 11
2001 has committed the nation to a national strategy that, in the long term, risks leaving Australia stranded in a highly vulnerable international position. Australia's policy of absolute commitment in support of the USA, including the deployment of Australian combat forces to Afghanistan and Iraq, and the unpopular detainment of Islamic refugees have all contributed to Australia being aligned with the minority of Western states that have been internationally denounced by terrorist organizations. This course of action has furthered the alienation of Australia among its regional neighbors and heightened the probability of terrorist attacks against
Australians. The ramifications of Australia's international response to the attacks of September 11 preclude a reverse of its national strategy, and therefore Australia's future is linked inextricably to American success against international terrorism. Equally, Australia's future is dependent on American political, economic and military responses to threats against Australian interests.
This paper analyses Australia's national strategy as a partner in the American led coalition against international terrorism and draws conclusions about the validity of the Australian Government's assessment of the strategic risks associated with its actions. In doing so, the paper identifies Australia's political responses and military actions since September 11 2001 with the purpose of describing the strategy's application and its risks. Next, the paper considers the impact of international terrorism on Australia's economy since September 11 and assesses the country's economic capacity to maintain its commitment to the War Against Terror. Finally, the paper concludes that the current Australian Government's strategy in the War Against Terror has, so far, been fundamentally sound although there are some high risk strategic issues that need to be addressed. If not addressed, those issues could easily lead to a diplomatic misunderstanding between Australia and other regional countries.
AUSTRALIA'S POLITICAL RESPONSE SINCE THE ATTACKS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
The Australian Federal Government openly condemned international terrorism because of the threat it poses to Australia's national interests. In particular, global and regional security, economic and political freedom, the promotion of human rights and the security of Australian citizens are all threatened by international terrorism. Never before in the nation's history has Australia been so susceptible to non-state aggression since the attacks on America in interests. This will almost be impossible to achieve unless the sensitive balance of Australia's international engagement and alliances are assessed accurately by the Howard government now and acted out with conviction in the years ahead. Continued economic growth combined with forecast low inflation and low levels of unemployment indicate that the War Against Terror has not had a major impact on Australia's overall economy despite the short term deficits. Additionally, the economy supported Australia's regional economic engagement to develop regional states and more open markets.
AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY POSTURE SINCE SEPTEMBER 2001
Commensurate with these overseas policy initiatives, the economy provided the resources to build a stronger defense force with an increase in spending of $2.1 billion over five years, and an unplanned $822 million has been allocated in 2003-04 to enhance Australia's homeland security. 45 Having met these demands, Australia's economic growth in 2003-04 is forecast to be a solid 3.25% 46 according to the Treasury Department.
International terrorism has had a marginally negative effect on the Australian economy, but so far Australia appears financially unburdened by its national strategy during the war against terror. If government predictions are valid, then no long-term economic detriment should result from the strategy. 47 However, many commentators warn of the longer term social costs they attribute to recent budget increases to homeland security and defense in particular at the expense of health and higher education programs. These reductions to health and higher education are argued to be a reduction of investment in the country's future population, and long-term social, political or economic harm could result if the reductions are longer than short lived.
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RISKS OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE WAR AGAINST TERROR
The Australian leadership will face a continuously changing international environment coupled with increased domestic pressures throughout the War Against Terror. The longer the war continues, the more likely there will be increased international and domestic tensions caused by the Australian Government's strategy. Notably, there is bipartisan agreement within the Australian Parliament that Australia is in "a very long war.
[That] could go on for a very long time…Just as the cold war went on for a very long time". 49 If this assessment by a member of the Parliamentary Opposition is accurate, then the risks surrounding the Government's political strategy are likely to increase the longer the war continues. Its ability to balance domestic politics and international credibility will be a measure of success of the political and military components of its strategy against terror.
The combined pressures from September 11 and the Bali bombing have caused Australia to move sharply from its established policy of reducing the Indonesian Military's (TNI) influence in Jakarta to a situation that has Australia seeking two separate and possibly mutually exclusive objectives. The immediate security priority is to have Jakarta act quickly and aggressively against Islamic extremist groups such as Jemaah Islamiah, which requires TNI engagement at the highest levels of government. This new priority contradicts Australia's concerted efforts to reduce TNI influence, because it undermines longer-term fragile democratic reforms that were the priority of Australian policy toward its nearest neighbor since the collapse of the Suharto regime. 50 This conflict between policy and action has resulted in Australian domestic tensions.
While there was a disconnect between policy and action with Indonesia, counter balancing this is the Howard Government's constructive response to the Philippines, which provides evidence that Australia is transparent, supportive and reliable within the region on issues related to terrorism.
Domestic opposition to the Australian Government's actions has focused on the ways of the national strategy and not the ends. Australian political ways deny the reality that voluntary acceptance of international rules is essential if there is to be a more civilized world. When
Australia rejects such agreements, as it is accused of doing because of its involvement in the war in Iraq and its treatment of Muslim refugees in Australia, it undermines its own broader international standing. Such hypocrisy encourages dictatorships and tyrannies worldwide and aligns Australia with strange company. 51 It is this perceived alignment with strange company that has caused the most domestic discourse in Australia and is potentially the most destabilizing issue on the domestic agenda regarding the war against terror. Of equal importance from a strategic perspective, the greatest risk is to Australia's long-term international standing on issues of international law and principal.
Former Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser has criticized supporters of the coalition against terror for having reverted to the Machiavellian dictum that the end justifies the means. In continued efforts to demonstrate independent policy and action, which are supportive of but not determined by the USA, Australia has made some progress. While there is difficulty measuring incremental success in the war against terror, that success was gauged against the national strategic ends. In doing so, this paper determined that the Australian political and military strategies employed since September 2001 were aligned with these objectives, and its strategy so far has been successful. Terrorists have not breached
Australia's security with a terrorist attack, nor is there evidence that terrorist groups are operating more freely beyond Afghanistan than they were two years ago, nor have they used weapons of mass destruction.
In examining the risks of Australia's strategy, it is clear that Australia's political strategy is inextricably linked to that of the USA. This has placed at risk Australia's standing in the international community as an independent and objective state. Further, Australia's military or economic strategies in the war against terror are susceptible to diversion because of the entanglement between these two countries political strategies. Therefore, this paper concludes with four clear recommendations that contribute to continued success of Australia's national security strategy. "…It recognises and sets out our responses to the salient features in our changing security environment: the emergence of new and more immediate threats from terrorism and increased concerns about the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
This statement also addresses our continuing concerns about developments in our immediate region which have consequences for Australia's interests. Since the horrific attacks of September 2001 and October 2002, the Government has taken steps to improve security, both domestically and internationally.
These actions, which include increased funding to intelligence agencies, improved immigration controls, new Defence capabilities to combat terrorism and improvements in airline security, have quickly and effectively responded to some of the major threats which have emerged.
This statement reviews the implications for Australia's defence posture. It concludes that while the principles set out in the Defence White Paper remain sound, some rebalancing of capability and expenditure will be necessary to take account of changes in Australia's strategic environment. This rebalancing will not fundamentally alter the size, structure and roles of the 30 a. a $10 million, four-year program to help Indonesia strengthen the counter-terrorism capacity of its police force, restrict the flow of funds to terrorists, and improve travel security through stronger airport, immigration and customs control capabilities.
b. training for regional security and intelligence agencies to enhance their capacity to disrupt terrorist activities in the region.
c. counter-terrorism investigation training in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji to improve management and analytical skills and intelligence support during terrorist attacks.
d. Australian Defence Force counter-terrorism exercises with special forces units of the armed forces of Thailand and the Philippines.
e. anti-money laundering training and workshops in Papua New Guinea and other Pacific island countries to strengthen regional controls on the flow of funds to terrorists.
f. assisting Pacific island countries to draft counter-terrorism legislation which they are required to implement under the Nasonini Declaration.
